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ARGUMENT 
I 
AT ALL TIMES SUBSEQUENT TO THE MARCH 12, 1986 
LETTER AGREEMENT, A BINDING CONTRACT EXISTED BETWEEN 
REPUBLIC AND THE SHAREHOLDERS OF WON-DOOR. 
The central issue in this case is raised by defendants1 
arguments that the March 12, 1986 letter agreement some how expired 
or became void because the letter agreement only provided for or 
applied to a sale of 22 percent of the stock of Won-Door and that 
the letter agreement was not modified and therefore that no 
contract or agreement existed between Republic and the shareholders 
of Won-Door until the August 22, 1986 agreement. 
This argument entirely ignores the undisputed facts, as 
clearly established in the detailed and un-rebutted affidavits of 
Irvin Bird, Mark McSwain and Bryant Cragun1, that when the 
principles of Republic met with Watkins shortly after receiving the 
March 12, 1986 letter agreement and explained to Watkins that 
Republic was having difficulty in finding a buyer for a minority 
interest in a closely held family corporation but had found 
considerable interest from buyers in acquiring all or at least a 
controlling interest in Won-Door, Watkins immediately agreed that 
1
 Record at pp. 180-88 and pp.474-486. It should be noted 
that Watkins filed a responsive affidavit after Bird's, McSwain's 
and Cragun's affidavits were filed and that Watkins did not 
controvert, in any material way, any of allegations contained in 
these affidavits. 
1 
Republic, as the finder for the shareholders of Won-Door under the 
March 12, 1986 agreement, should seek out buyers for all of the 
stock of Won-Door. 
Inasmuch as it was obvious that a fee greater than the 
$250,000 for the sale of 22% of the stock of Won-Door, as agreed in 
March 12, 1986 letter, should be paid to Republic if it was 
successful in finding a buyer for all of the stock of Won-Door at 
a proportionably higher price, Bird and the other principles asked 
Watkins what fee Republic would be paid if Republic found a buyer 
for all of the stock of Won-Door. Watkins responded that he would 
have to think about it, but in any event would pay Republic a fair 
or reasonable fee and that, due to his long standing relationship 
as a friend and former attorney for Irvin Bird, he should be 
trusted to see that Republic was paid a fair fee in line with his 
prior agreements. 
At that point (March or early April of 1986) it is clear that 
Watkins agreed to amend or broaden the scope of the March 12, 1986 
agreement and pay to Republic a fee in the event Republic found a 
buyer for all of the stock of Won-Door. It is also clear that 
Watkins agreed to pay a fair or reasonable fee impliedly greater 
than the $250,000 fee that Republic was to receive if it found a 
buyer for only 22% of the stock of Won-Door. 
Further as a matter of common sense Defendants1 argument that 
the March 12, 1986 agreement to pay Republic a fee $250,000 for 
finding a buyer for 22% of the stock of Won-Door imposed no 
2 
contractual obligation on the shareholders of Won-Door to pay 
Republic at least $250,000 in the event Republic eventually found 
an buyer acceptable to the shareholders who purchased more than 22% 
of does not make sense. 
Stated in terms of more common experience, this argument is 
tantamount to arguing that a real estate broker who finds an 
acceptable buyer who eventually purchases all of your 100 acres is 
not entitled to a fee as a result of the sale because the listing 
agreement only covers 22 acres notwithstanding the fact that the 
seller, after listing the seven acres, encouraged the broker to 
find a buyer for of all of property and agreed to a pay a fair fee 
impliedly in line with the increased revenue realized if the broker 
was successful in selling the additional acres. 
It is also undisputed that Republic relying on this agreement 
and at Watkins1 continual encouragement sought out and contacted 
some twenty to thirty companies for the purpose of selling all of 
the stock of Won-Door prior to the time Watkins entered into the 
exclusive finders agreement with Boettcher in late April 28 without 
notice to Republic. 
It is also undisputed that one of the companies contacted by 
Republic pursuant to Watkins1 agreement that Republic find a buyer 
for all of Won-Doors stock was Thermal System's Inc. (TSI) who in 
3 
October of 1986 purchased all of the Defendant's stock in Won-Door 
for some $39,000,000.2 
It should be noted that the sale of all of the stock to TSI 
is entirely consistent with the objective set forth in the Letter 
agreement of March 12, 1986 between Watkins and Republic wherein 
Watkins is states that the objective of the shareholder in selling 
stock in Won-Door to further their goal to "become a public company 
within five year period". As a result of the TSI acquisition of 
Won-Door, Won-Door became a wholly owned subsidiary of a public 
company and with the former shareholders of Won-Door now holding 
stock in the public company. 
The foregoing undisputed facts establish as a matter of law 
that at the time Watkins entered into the Boettcher agreement and 
at the time he negotiated the August 22, 1986 with Republic there 
was, in fact, a binding enforceable agreement whereby the 
shareholders of Won-Door where clearly obligated to pay to Republic 
a reasonable fee exceeding $250,000 in the event one of Republic's 
contacts purchased the stock of Won-Door. 
2
 Defendants' unsupported statement that the sale of Won-Door 
was pursuant to an installment sale agreement and that TSI 
defaulted in it's payments to the shareholders of Won-Door is 
simply untrue. The closing documents of the sale, the public 
records of the Security and Exchange Commission and the records of 
United States Bankruptcy Court for Utah in the TSI bankruptcy 
action clearly show that on October 26, 1986 the shareholders of 
Won-Door received $15,000,000 in cash and shares in TSI with a 
market value on that day of $24,750,000.00 and that Boettcher 
received a fee of $2 57,000.00. 
4 
Although Republic does not dispute that Watkins was free to 
enter into the subsequent contract with Boettcher, such contract in 
no way operated to limit Republic's claim to a reasonable fee to 
the "ten exclusions" in the Boettcher agreement in the event one of 
it's contacts purchased all of the stock of Won-Door under it's 
prior agreements with Watkins absent an clear agreement by Republic 
to be bound by Watkins' subsequent agreement with Boettcher. 
It is undisputed that prior to August 22, 1986 Republic did 
not agree to be bound by the terms of the Boettcher agreement and 
affirmatively informed Watkins that Republic did not feel it was 
bound to limit it's claim to a fee under it's prior agreements with 
Watkins to a list of 10 qualified companies if a contact of 
Republics purchased the stock in Won-Door which was not on "the 
list of 10 qualified companies". 
In this regard, Republic submits that Watkins' recognized (i) 
that he had agreed to pay Republic a reasonable fee in the event 
one of Republic's contacts brought all of Won-Door's stock; and 
(ii) that under the term's of his subsequent agreement with 
Boettcher, Watkins also recognized that the shareholders of Won-
Door or Watkins himself3 may well be obligated to pay a 
3
 It is undisputed that as a result of the TSI acquisition of 
Won-Door, Watkins and members of his family received cash and stock 
exceeding $1.8 million dollars and immediately upon the acquisition 
Watkins became chief financial officer of TSP and eventually became 
chief executive officer of TSP at substantial salaries. Watkins may 
well have been a principle in the transaction as well as agent for 
the shareholders. 
5 
substantial finders fee to both Republic and Boettcher in event 
that a contact brought to him by Republic, but not excluded under 
his agreement with Boettcher, purchased all of the stock of Won-
Door. 
It was recognition that two fees may have to be paid that 
motivated Watkins to induce Republic to enter into the August 22, 
1986 agreement — not that Watkins merely wanted to settled a 
dispute over a obligation that Defendants now urge clearly did not 
exist at the time of the August 22, 1986 agreement. 
Although successful in inducing Republic to enter into the 
August 22, 1986 agreement, Watkins clearly induced Republic to 
enter into the August 22, 1986 by misrepresention. 
II 
THE AUGUST 22, 1986 AGREEMENT IS NOT ENFORCEABLE 
AND IS NOT CONTROLLING AS TO REPUBLIC'S CLAIM FOR IT'S 
FEE. 
On Friday evening August 22, 1986, Watkins came to Republic's 
offices ostensibly for the purposes of entering in to written 
agreement clearly defining what fee Republic would receive in the 
event Leucadia, one of Republic's contacts, purchased all of the 
stock of Won-Door in that Leucadia had informed Watkins that it 
intended to make a firm offer for all of the stock of the following 
Monday. 
6 
As established in the detailed and un-rebutted affidavits of 
Irvin Bird and Mark McSwain, a heated discussion ensued which 
continued over a period of several hours. 
The source of the dispute was that Bird and McSwain were 
unwilling to enter into the agreement (hand drafted by Watkins at 
the meeting) because the agreement provided that Republic would 
only get a fee exceeding $5000 if either Leucadia or one of "ten 
listed qualified companies" purchased the stock of Won-Door. Bird 
and McSwain informed Watkins that Republic had, with Watkins1 
express agreement and encouragment, contacted approximately thirty 
companies and, although Republic wanted to cooperate with Watkins 
in his dealings with Boettcher, felt they were under no obligation 
to limit Republic's fee to "ten contacts" at least without out 
knowing who the identity of companies with which Watkins had been 
dealing. 
Bird and McSwain informed Watkins that it was Republic's 
positon that under it's prior agreements with Watkins it was 
entitled to a fee if any of it's contacts purchased the stock of 
Won-Door regardless of the undisclosed term of Watkins' agreement 
with Boettcher.4 
4
 Paragraph 6 of the Boettcher Agreement specifically 
required that the list of "ten exclusions" be submitted to 
Boettcher not later than May 7, 1986. Contrary to Defendant's 
statement in their Brief no where in the record is it shown that 
any list of any exclusions was ever submitted to Boettcher by 
Watkins or by any one else at Won-Door. 
However, counsel for Defendants are fully aware that 
Boettcher, in response to Republic's subpoena duce tecum has 
7 
In response, Watkins misrepresented to Bird and McSwain that 
he was only dealing with two companies - Leucadia and one other and 
the other company is not one of your companies . 
Inasmuch as Bird and McSwain had agreed upon the Lehman 
Formula would be an acceptable fee in the event Leucadia purchased 
all of stock of Won-Door and because Watkins had falsely 
represented that the other company that he was dealing with was not 
one of Republic's companies and therefore Republic would not be 
entitled to a fee if the other company bought the stock of Won-
Door, Bird and McSwain executed the August 22, 1986 agreement. 
In fact, the other company who Watkins had been negotiating 
since early July of 1986 was TSI and was clearly one of Republic's 
produced copies of it's entire file on the matter and that no where 
in the Boettcher files was any list of exclusions as alleged in 
Defendants' Brief. There is in Boettcher's file a detailed list of 
all of Boettcher's contacts which does not include TSI. 
Defendants also rely on the fact that Boettcher received 
it's fee as a result of the sale to TSI. It undisputed that under 
the express terms of the Boettcher agreement Boettcher would be 
entitled to a fee of at the time of sale of all of the stock of 
Won-Door to TSI of some $489,000 if TSI where not listed as an 
exclusion to the Boettcher agreement and a fee of $25,000 if TSI 
was listed as an exclusion to the agreement. It is undisputed that 
Boettcher received a total fee of $257,000 as result of TSI's 
acquistion of Won-Door. This fee is exactly half the difference 
between the two fees provided for in the contract. Although 
discovery was continuing, Republic suggests that evidence developed 
before the case was dismissed clearly shows that Watkins never 
supplied Boettcher with any list of exclusions as he represented to 
Republic and that there is at least an inference that Boettcher 
agreed to compromise it's fee by splitting the difference between 
the two possible fees under its contract with Watkins because, 
although TSI was not exclusion under the contract due to the fact 
that no list of 10 exclusions was ever submitted to Boettcher by 
Watkins, TSI was a company brought to Watkins by Republic before 
Watkins' agreement with Boettcher. 
8 
contacts and was listed on Republic's list of May 27, 1986 that was 
previously hand delivered to Watkins by Bird and was a contact 
which Bird had previously discussed with Watkins in extensive 
detail in an effort to dissuade him from entering into any deal 
with TSI even though it was one of Republic's contacts. 
Defendants suggestions that Watkins did not know that TSI was 
the same company as Thermal Systems Inc; that Thermal System Inc. 
did not buy the stock of Won-Door or that TSI does not appear on 
any of Republic's lists because item 9 on the May 27, 1986 list of 
companies hand delivered to Watkins by Bird lists Thermal Systems 
Inc. as opposed to TSI or TS industries are entirely insupportable. 
As stated above, Bird in a meeting at Watkins' office, in 
early May of 1986 discussed in detail who TSI was, it's background, 
who the principles were, the nature of it's business and presented 
SEC filings on TSI to Watkins' clearly identifying TSP as Thermal 
Systems Inc and TS Industries. 
Further, at this time TSI had a large Salt Lake City plant 
just few blocks from Watkins' office with a large sign on it's 
building "Thermal Systems .Inc". Given the level of Watkins' 
familiarity with Thermal Systems Inc., Defendant's arguments are 
the equivalent of claiming that a sophisticated and knowledgeable 
businessman familiar with the computer industry had no idea that 
IBM was the same company as International Business Machines. 
9 
Contrary to the Defendants1 unpersuasive argument "that it 
strongly believes that Watkins did nothing wrong and that he did 
not make any misrepresentation",5 Bird's and McSwain's un-rebutted 
affidavits clear demonstrate that Watkins affirmatively 
misrepresented to Bird and McSwain that he was not dealing with any 
of Republic's contacts other than Leucadia. 
Such misrepresentation obviously was designed to and would 
reasonably lead Bird and McSwain to believe that the provisions in 
August 22,1986 agreement limiting Republic's fee to Leiucadia and 
the "ten listed qualified companies" were irrelevant and that 
therefore Republic could enter into the August 22, 1986 agreement, 
as an accommodation to Watkins, with out effecting Republic's right 
to receive a fee consistent with Watkins' prior agreements. 
Obviously, it is this same provision regarding the "ten 
exclusions" upon which Defendants subsequently based their entire 
position that Republic was only entitled to a fee a $5000 as result 
of the TSI acquisition of Won-Door for $39,000,000 - some $245,000 
less than the fee Watkins intially agreed to pay Republic in the 
event one of Republic's contact bought 22% of Won-Door's stock for 
$7,392,000 under the terms of the March 12, 1986 agreement. 
5
 Defendants attempt to avoid liability for Watkins' actions 
by claiming he has been discharged in bankruptcy. This argument 
ignores the unquestioned fact that Watkins was at all times acting 
as a fully authorized agent for the shareholders of Won-Door and 
that his actions were binding upon them notwithstanding his 
subsequent discharge in bankruptcy. 
10 
From any point of view this position can not be considered to 
be consistent with the either Watkins1 or Republic!s reasonable 
expectations under Watkins1 prior agreement to expand the March 12, 
1986 agreement to provide that the shareholders of Won-Door would 
pay Republic a reasonable or fair fee consistent with the March 12, 
1986 agreement if one of it's contact purchase all of the stock of 
Won-Door. 
Republic readily admits that the law recognizes that there is 
risk in every contract and courts will not intervene to remedy a 
bad bargain or grant rights to parties to a contract for which they 
did not otherwise bargain. However, basic contract law also does 
not require parties bear the risk of a bad bargain which was 
procured by a material misrepresentation or a even a material 
mistake of fact so essential to the reasonable intent of the 
contracting parties as to render the contract not to embody a true 
meeting of the minds. 
Further if the parties to the agreement are already in a 
contractual relationship, as in this case, a duty of good faith and 
fair dealing is imposed on both parties not knowingly to do 
anything that would destroy or injure the other parties right to 
receive the fruits of the contract and the parties actions must be 
consistent with the common purpose and justified expectation of the 
parties in light of the terms of the prior contract and the course 
of the dealings between and the conduct of the parties. St. 
11 
Benedict's Development Co, v. St, Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194 
(Utah 1991). 
Under the undisputed facts of this case the August 22, 1986 
agreement is as a matter of law unenforceable and should not 
operate to limit Republic's fee to $5000 as a result of the sale of 
all of the stock of Won-Door to TSI. 
Likewise, Defendants' arguments that (i) the August 22, 1986 
agreement constitutes an accord and satisfaction; (ii) that the 
parties prior agreements are merged into the August 22, 1986; (ii), 
that Watkins did not breach his duty of good faith and fair dealing 
owed to Republic; or (iv) that Plaintiff has not presented facts 
supporting a claim for fraud should be all be rejected, 
III 
REPUBLICS CLAIMS OF ESTOPPEL WERE FULLY PRESENTED TO 
THE TRIAL COURT AND ARE REVIEWABLE ON APPEAL 
Defendant argue that because the Republic's complaint did not 
separately allege estoppel as a cause of action in it's complaint 
the issue is not reviewable by this court. 
The argument that the legal nature of the claim must 
denominated and be set forth as a separate claim has simply not 
been the law in Utah since introduction of the modern rules of 
civil procedure embodying the concept of notice pleading. 
The underlying purpose of notice pleading is to afford the 
parties full opportunity to obtain the appropriate relief on any 
12 
claim reasonably embodied in the facts and the inferences that can 
be reasonable drawn therefrom that are fairly presented to the 
trial court. 
In this case Republic admits that it's Complaint does not have 
a separate cause of action denominated "promissory estoppel". 
However, the facts plead in the complaint and the reasonable 
inference that can be drawn therefrom form sufficient factual basis 
to support the elements required for a claim for promissory 
estoppel. 
More importantly, Republic's claim of promissory estoppel was 
clearly and fully presented and argued to the trial court and 
Republic's claim of estoppel was certainly not presented to this 
court for the first time as Defendant argues. 
Beginning on page 29 of Republic's detailed Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support 
of Plaintiff Motion for Partial Summary filed with the trial court 
and served upon Defendants there appears the follow argument: 
"III 
DEFENDANTS BY THE CONDUCT OF THEIR OWN AGENT, 
REED WATKINS, ARE ESTOPPED TO DENY, (i) THE VALIDITY OF THE 
March 12, AGREEMENT, AND (ii) THAT A FEE BASED UPON A 
REASONABLE APPLICATION OF THE March 12 Agreement IS DUE 
REPUBLIC." 
Republic's argument regarding estoppel continues for some 
6 pages making substantially the same detailed arguments regarding 
13 
Republic's claims regarding estoppel to the trial court as are 
found in Republic's Brief to this court. 
It simply can not be argued that Republic's claims regarding 
estoppel were not squarely before the trial court at the time the 
trial court dismissed Republic claims. 
Further, in Defendants' Reply to Republic's Memorandum in the 
trial court and in oral argument to the trial court, Defendants, 
while addressing the merits of the Republic's claims of estoppel, 
at no time claimed surprise or that facts supporting a claim of 
estoppel were not fairly embodied in Plaintiff's complaint or the 
claim of estoppel was not in anyway properly before the trial 
court. 
The clear record in this case demonstrates that, in fact, 
it is the Defendants, not the Plaintiffs, that are raising an issue 
for the first time on appeal and Plaintiff submits that the 
Defendants' completely insupportable arguments that estoppel was 
not fairly before the trial court are merely an obvious attempt to 
side step the merits of a well taken argument that was fully 
presented to the trial court and is now properly before this court. 
CONCLUSION 
Although this case, upon initial examination, appears to be 
a complicated case from both a factual and legal standpoint, 
Plaintiff submits that upon a thorough review of the undisputed 
facts that were established and presented to the trial court it 
14 
becomes abundantly clear that prior to August 22, 1986 that a 
binding agreement between Watkins and Republic was reached which, 
by either its express terms or by estoppel, obligated the 
shareholders of Won-Door to pay to Republic a reasonable fee as is 
fairly implied under the terms of the March 12, 1986 agreement in 
the event one of Republic's contacts purchased all of the stock. 
Further, the August 22, 1986 agreement that Defendants claimed 
as controlling when TSI acquired all of the stock of Won-Door was 
procured by clear material misrepresentation by Watkins and was not 
controlling as to the rights and obligations of the parties and 
should have been rejected by the trial court. 
Republic requests that this court reverse the trial court's 
order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the 
trial court's implied denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and enter an order granting Plaintiff's motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and remanding the matter to the trial 
court for further proceeding on Republic's claims of fraud. 
Dated this /day of June 1993. 
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